In a recent survey of the literature on the relation between information and confirmation, Crupi and Tentori (Stud Hist Philos Sci 47:81-90, 2014) claim that the former is a fruitful source of insight into the latter, with two well-known measures of confirmation being definable purely information-theoretically. I argue that of the two explicata of semantic information (due originally to Bar Hillel and Carnap) which are considered by the authors, the one generating a popular Bayesian confirmation measure is a defective measure of information, while the other, although an admissible measure of information, generates a defective measure of confirmation. Some results are proved about the representation of measures on consequence-classes.
Introduction
Originating famously with Francis Bacon, the pursuit of a provably or even probably reliable set of rules of inductive inference suffered a severe reverse in the mideighteenth century, under the onslaught of Hume's celebrated sceptical arguments whose continuing failure to be definitively refuted after two centuries of strenuous attempts was famously dubbed by Broad 'the scandal of philosophy'. 1 And so matters stood until, under the pioneering leadership of Rudolf Carnap, attention was diverted 1 Broad (1926) away from trying to refute Hume's arguments 2 to the less intimidating task of 'explicating' inductive concepts, like degree of confirmation, confirming instance, evidential support, and so on, in so doing begetting the thriving enterprise now known as confirmation theory.
One of the more interesting sub-projects to emerge from this programme has been an appeal to information-theoretic ideas in the hope that they would illuminate confirmation-theoretic ones. The idea that the acquisition of new information should be related to confirmation and disconfirmation seems on the face of it natural enough: as the authors of a recent extensive survey put it, the impact of a piece of evidence (data, premise) on a given hypothesis (theory, conclusion) must reflect how the former affects an antecedent state of information concerning the latter. Relatedly, a rational agent would gather evidence because it provides information concerning certain possible states of affairs, i.e., for it can confirm/disconfirm relevant hypotheses. (Crupi and Tentori 2014, p. 81 .)
The subject-matter of confirmation theory is however typically statements, statements of hypotheses and evidence, and the application of information-theoretic notions required a suitable redefinition of the hitherto purely statistical definition of information introduced in the work of Claude Shannon. That transformation, into what he called semantic information, carried by the sentences of some appropriate language L, was undertaken by Carnap in a pioneering paper with Bar Hillel and Carnap (1953 3 ), laying the foundations for nearly all subsequent work in the field. 4
Improbability, measure and information
The seminal nature of Bar Hillel and Carnap's paper is duly acknowledged by Crupi and Tentori in their survey, citing its 'canonical formulation' of the basic intuition concerning the amount of information conveyed by a statement:
Being told that the outcome of the draw is a picture of hearts provides more information in comparison, because this singles out a small subset of possibilities that was initially rather improbable. In philosophy, this basic idea found its canonical formulation in seminal work by Bar-Hillel and Carnap (Crupi and Tentori (2014), p. 81) Two ideas are brought together here: the extent of the subset of possibilities admitted, and its probability. Let M(a) (my notation) denote the class of possibilities admitted by 2 These are all variations on the following: that any attempt to infer anything about the future from the past will necessarily beg the question. Howson (2013) argues that this argument translates straightforwardly into a theorem of the probability calculus, and hence that attempts to challenge it while remaining within a probabilistic framework are doomed to failure. 3 An earlier technical report by the two authors (Carnap and Bar Hillel 1952) , of which their 1953 paper is a more concise published version, is useful for its additional explanatory remarks and will be cited often in the present paper. 4 Carnap's ideas were further developed in a number of influential papers by Hintikka (see e.g. Hintikka 1968 , 1970 ). a proposition a in some suitable language L. 5 Then the complement * M(a) of M(a) is the class of possibilities prohibited by a. The more extensive it is, the more possibilities a's truth rules out, and the more a can be taken as asserting: indeed, it is easy to see that a logically entails b just in case * M(b) is (set-theoretically) included in * M(a). Accordingly Bar Hillel and Carnap took * M(a) to represent qualitatively the content of a 6 . Their next step was to put a numerical measure on * M(a), and here they were able to exploit Carnap's monumental earlier work on inductive probability Carnap (1950) in which he had defined a restricted class of normalised measure functions m(a) on the sentences of L. These functions induce a corresponding class of measures on the M(a), each of which, since * M(a) = M(∼a), takes the value m(∼a) = 1 − m(a) on * M(a).
The m-functions are formally probability functions, to signal which I will henceforth write p(a) instead of m(a). 1 − p(a) is therefore one explication of the amount of information in a. But there is another sense of the amount of information in a for which 1 − p(a) is not an appropriate measure. This is the sense in which the informativeness of a sentence can be gauged by how unexpected its truth would be in the light of what else you know. Given that 1 − p(a) is a decreasing function of probability, it might be thought that this sense is automatically captured by that measure. But this is not so. In the case of two probabilistically independent sentences the amount of information in their conjunction is plausibly the sum of the amounts in each, but to deliver this feature the information-measure, considered as a decreasing function of probability, must be minus the logarithm to some base (greater than 1) of p(a). So now we have two probability-based information-measures, 1-p and -logp, explicating these two different senses of information, respectively referred to by Bar Hillel and Carnap as cont (for 'content') and inf. 7
Four explicata and a difference
While these explications have become canonical, the simple logical framework and the restricted class of probability functions employed by Bar Hillel and Carnap have since largely been abandoned, for a combination of mathematical and philosophical reasons too extensive to go into here, replaced by a largely formalism-free environment where the only probability function involved is some coherent representation of belief, i.e. a finitely or possibly countably-additive probability function defined on at the outset or extendable to a Boolean algebra of propositions. This is the sort of 'broadly Bayesian' context in which Crupi and Tentori locate their own discussion, 8 retaining Bar Hillel 5 In Bar Hillel and Carnap's paper M(a) is finite for each a: it is the set of state-descriptions admitted by a when a is formulated in a finite monadic predicate language without equality (informally speaking, the state-descriptions are the finest partition of possibility definable in the language). 6 Actually they called it the Content of a (upper case 'c'). and Carnap's explicata cont and inf but employing their own notation for them as 'inf D ' and 'inf R ' respectively. 9 Bar Hillel and Carnap had also defined two measures of relative information, cont(a|b) and inf(a|b), based on the corresponding one-place functions. Where 'I' stands for either 'cont' or 'inf', Bar Hillel and Carnap's two-place functions are explicitly defined in terms of the one-place functions as follows:
From (1) (1) generates interesting notions of informational independence for each of inf and cont. We can say that a is informationally independent of b just in case I(a|b) = I(a), and hence just in case I(a&b) = I(a) + I(b), which sounds intuitively right and is symmetrical in a and b. Instantiating this with inf, we have −logp(a&b) = −[logp(b) + logp(a)], i.e. p(a&b) = p(a)p(b), so informational independence holds for inf just when a and b are probabilistically independent. Cont is dual to probability in that the same formulas involving & and v symmetrically hold for both, from which follows the analogue of the general addition rule for probabilities:
Hence informational independence holds iff cont(a&b) = cont(a) + cont(b) iff cont(avb) = 0 iff p(avb) = 1: i.e. the measure of their contingent content in common is zero. So informational independence holds for cont just when a and b are content-disjoint. Crupi and Tentori also define a corresponding pair of relative functions, inf D (a|b) and inf R (a|b). While they do not say explicitly what 'presystematic' notions of relative information these are intended to capture, it is clear from their text that each function is simply the result of substituting the updated probability p(a|b) for p(a) in the measures 1 − p(a) and −logp(a) respectively; i.e. inf R (a|b) = −logp(a|b) and inf D (a|b) = Footnote 8 continued there are many contexts where standard finitary languages are incapable of expressing the propositions of interest: for example, the infinite disjunction 'a ticket numbered 1 will win or a ticket numbered 2 will win or a ticket numbered 3 will win or ....', in the context of a countably infinite lottery whose tickets are labelled by the (numerals for) the natural numbers. 9 Crupi and Tentori (2014) , p. 84. The 'R' is for 'ratio', the 'D' for 'difference'; we shall see why in the following section. 10 Bar Hillel and Carnap allow b to be a class of statements, like a body of background assumptions, but if, as is usually assumed, the class is finite it can of course be represented by a single conjunction.
1 − p(a|b). 11 inf R (a|b) is extensionally the same function of a and b as Bar Hillel and Carnap's inf(a|b), but not so inf D (a|b) and cont(a|b), which are easily seen to differ from each other by a factor p(b). A result of Milne (2014, cited by Crupi and Tentori) implies that the functions inf D (a|b) and inf R (a|b) can be interpreted as measures of information-added, raising the question of how in that case inf D (a|b) and Bar Hillel and Carnap's cont(a|b) can consistently differ. The answer is that two different notions of addition are being appealed to: for Bar Hillel and Carnap it is arithmetical addition expressed by (1), whereas in Milne's paper it is something like proportional addition: 'a proposition adds the more information to b the greater the proportion of possibilities left open by the corpus b that it rules out ' (2014, p. 253) . 12 While that aspect of Crupi and Tentori's relative measures has some technical interest, their own interpretation of them as merely the result of updating the probability function in each case not only identifies an important concept left unnoticed, or 'unexplicated', by Bar Hillel and Carnap, but is also indispensable in delivering the connection Crupi and Tentori aim to establish between information and confirmation. As they put it, If the evidence acquired decreases (increases) the degree of unexpectedness of a hypothesis of interest, the credibility of such hypothesis is thereby positively (negatively) affected. A simple way to convey this natural idea is to represent the belief change concerning h provided by e, bc(h, e), by means of the plain difference between inf(h) and inf(h|e). [On substituting respectively inf R and inf D ] two classical confirmation measures are thus immediately recovered: (Crupi and Tentori 2014, p. 82) These equations certainly look like a neat demonstration of some of the 'key connections between information and confirmation' claimed to exist by Crupi and Tentori (2014, p. 81) . Despite that apparently happy concordance, my own view of the matter, which I will argue in what follows, is very different from theirs, and my conclusion will be that despite their optimistic assessment, the connections are superficial at best and certainly far from 'key'. That is to come; first, we need to review some salient facts about bc R and bc D (I will use Crupi and Tentori's terminology).
Information and confirmation
bc D , i.e. p(h|e) − p(h), is of course a favourite Bayesian measure of evidential support, with several independent considerations in its favour. One of these is the simple naturalness of subtracting the prior from the posterior probability. Another, as is wellknown and easily checked, is that any consequence e of a hypothesis h confirms h so long as 0 < p(e), p(h) < 1. Though this might seem to invite the so-called tacking paradox, since the conjunction of h with any, even nonsensical, statement h will also be positively supported, the paradox is neatly avoided by another easily-checked fact, that bc D (h&h |e) = p(h |h)bc D (h|e). So if h is tacked on to h, the support of the conjunction h&h measured by bc D will be reduced in proportion to how unlikely h is given h. 13 Thirdly, bc D (h, e) gives a simple and intuitively satisfying explanation of why evidence used to calculate parameters in a theory fails to provide supporting evidence to the same extent that directly predicted evidence does (Howson 1990 ). There is of course more to be said, as the extensive literature on confirmation measures testifies, and which the interested reader is invited to consult.
What about inf R ? The confirmation function bc R based on it is easily seen to be equal to log[p(e|h)/p(e)] where p(e) and p(h) are both positive, which means that where two hypotheses h and h both entail e, bc R depends only on p(e) (it is equal to −logp(e)) and so h and h both receive the same bc R value). 14 It follows that bc R can't in principle discriminate between 'All emeralds are grue' and 'All emeralds are green' on a sample of green emeralds, surely a disastrous feature of any theory of confirmation seeking to model informal inductive reasoning. 15 By contrast bc D (h, e) depends on the prior p(h), so it naturally copes with the grue problem by allowing the prior probability of the 'grue' hypothesis to be very small, for most people probably zero, 16 compared with that of the other. It might be objected that 'All emeralds are grue' is equally supported by the sample, the difference between the two hypotheses being not one of empirical support but simply of priors. There seems to be a simple answer to the objection, which is that no-one should regard a contradiction as supported by any 13 See also Crupi and Tentori (2010). 14 Note that this feature is inherited also by instantiating inf(h) -inf(h|e) with Bar Hillel and Carnap's measures cont(h) and cont(h|e) respectively where cont(h|e) is defined by (1): the result is easily seen to be equal to cont(evh) and thence, when h entails e, to inf(e). It might seem surprising therefore, given their endorsement of (1), that a principal objective also of Bar Hillel and Carnap was to exhibit a close connection between confirmation and semantic information. The mystery is dispelled once we recall that by 'degree of confirmation' Bar Hillel and Carnap meant nothing more than conditional probability where the probability was what Carnap called 'logical probability'. Carnap called bc D 'incremental confirmation', i.e. the change in Carnapian degree of confirmation. 15 Though it is endorsed by Milne (1996) : one of Milne's key assumptions in his derivation of this confirmation measure is that that if e has the same probability given h and h then h and h are equally confirmed by it (desideratum 5, p. 21). He remarks 'Viewed correctly, I submit, [the assumption] is ... utterly compelling ' (1996, p. 22) . Utterly compelling it may seem, until viewed in both green and grue light. 16 This of course raises the question of how p(e|h) is to be understood if p(h) is zero, given that the usual rule p(e|h) = p(e&h)/p(h) breaks down. Fortunately there are satisfactory axiomatisations of conditional probability in which p(e|h) is meaningful when p(h) = 0, so long as h is not a contradiction (among others De Finetti 1974, vol. 2, p. 339; Coletti and Scozzafava 2002, p. 76; Popper 1959 , Appendix *iv; the measures satisfying Popper's axioms are known as Popper functions).
evidence at all, and presumably the same should go for any statement probabilistically indistinguishable from it.
Another well-known measure of confirmation besides bc D and bc R is the log-odds measure log[odds(h|e)/odds(h)] = log[p(e|h)/p(e|∼h)], attributed by Good (1950) to A.M. Turing who developed it during World War 2 (it has the attractive feature of adding over a conjunction e 1 &e 2 &. . .&e n if the e i are conditionally independent given h and given ∼h). Crupi and Tentori claim (2014, p. 89) , without argument, that the information-theoretic approach can be naturally extended to this, implying that it too is equal to inf(h) − inf(h|e) for some information measure inf. However, the function f(p) generating inf as a function of probability p is −log[odds(p)], which is arguably highly improper: it is negative for 1/2 < p < 1, and, appending plus and minus ∞ to the real numbers (the enlarged set is called 'the extended real number system'), takes the value −∞ on tautologies. 17 It is far from clear what it might mean to say that a sentence contains negative information. Nor can negative values be eliminated simply by a shift of scale. In addition, this function is concave over half its domain (in the interval (1/2, 1)), and as I will show later, in Sect. 6, this implies that it cannot be represented by any corresponding measure on consequence-classes (I will explain why this should be thought to be bad when we come to that discussion). It is certainly plausible that information should be a decreasing function of a suitable uncertainty measure which rates the more plausible above the less plausible, but the odds scale is extremely skewed, a transformation of the symmetric probability scale sending probability 1 to infinity while keeping 0 common to both. Also sacrificed by that transformation is the crucial property of additivity, and for these reasons the odds scale was superseded for scientific work by the probability scale, and information as a function of uncertainty is measured by probabilities and not by odds. 18 So what is there to support Crupi and Tentori's claim that 'treating information and confirmation in a unified fashion is an intuitive and fruitful approach' (Crupi and Tentori 2014, p. 81) ? bc D and bc R may be representable as differences between ex ante and ex post measures of information, but bc R seems fatally defective for the reasons described above, and if my argument above is correct then the Turing measure has no relation to information at all. As for bc D , the popular choice among Bayesians, I will argue in what follows that its representation as a difference of quantities of information is actually spurious. In brief, my argument will be that, despite its distinguished pedigree in the theory of semantic information, the measure 1-p(.) should not qualify as an admissible measure of information at all. This might seem an absurd claim given the virtual consensus to the contrary, but the symptoms of infirmity are already there, as we shall now see.
The infirmity of inf D
The trouble starts to appear with the Bar Hillel-Carnap measure cont(h|e) defined, we recall, by (1) as cont(h&e) − cont(e), and having the consequence, as we noted in Sect. 3, that cont(h|e) = cont(e → h). That the definition (1) should engender any problems is rather surprising, since all it does is express a fairly natural notion of excess information in h with respect to e; moreover, as we also saw in Sect. 3, and as should be expected of an adequate measure of excess information, cont(h|e) is informationally independent of e in the sense of their common content having (cont) measure 0.
This pleasing appearance of harmony is deceptive, however, and you don't have to look far to see that something is actually very dissonant in e → h cast in the role of carrying the excess content in h over e. For suppose h is a general hypothesis of science and e the statement of the necessarily finite amount of evidence gathered so far and predicted by h. In comparison with h, e → h is an extremely weak statement, being implied by the already very weak ∼e. 19 In other words, we must have cont(∼e) ≥ cont(e → h). But since cont(e) + cont(e → h) = cont(h) when h entails e, we infer that cont(e)+cont(∼e) ≥ cont(h), which seems absurd in the type of case pointed out by Jeffrey (1984) , where h is a universal hypothesis of universal scope, and e records a relatively small finite number of its instances. But it is what (1) tells us we should accept. Reductio! (surely?)
At this point the reader acquainted with some of the stranger byways of philosophy of science may recall that Miller and Popper's notorious 'disproof' of probabilistic induction (Miller and Popper 1983 ) turned on the fact that e → h is negatively supported by e according to the bc D measure if h entails e. Instead of seeing in this fact something amiss with taking e → h as representing the excess content of h over e, Miller and Popper bizarrely viewed it as a reductio of the claim that e inductively supports h, on the ground that truly inductive support must extend to the part of h's informational content going beyond e. Since bc D (h, e) = bc D (e → h, e) + bc D (e, e), the positive value of bc D (h, e) consequent on the fact that h entails e (assuming 0 < p(h), p(e) < 1) can only be due to the confirmation of e by e outweighing the disconfirmation of e → h, the (supposed) excess content. Hence, reasoned Miller and Popper, the confirmation of h by e must be the purely deductive confirmation of e by itself.
As virtually all commentators have agreed, this must be wrong. If, as Miller and Popper claim, and (1) endorses, e → h is truly the information in h going beyond e, then it is absurd to claim that e → h can be countersupported by e: e should be confirmationally neutral vis-à-vis e → h, an informationally-independent piece of information ('supported' would of course have been just as bad). That granted, the obvious target of Miller's and Popper's reductio should surely have been the claim that e → h represents the excess information in h over e. 20 Small wonder then that Crupi and Tentori feel confident in maintaining their own construal of inf D (h|e): 'our reliance on inf D throughout this paper does not imply in any way Popper and Miller's ... controversial assumption that e → h represents all of the content of h that goes beyond e (Crupi and Tentori (2014), p. 82) . And the Crupi-Tentori construal has, of course, the additional bonus of delivering the confirmation measure bc D . But, pace Crupi and Tentori, it is no mere 'assumption' that e → h represents all of the information in h that goes beyond e. On the contrary, it is a theorem: a consequence of the equation (1) 1-p(.) . If the Popper-Miller example is a reductio of anything, then it seems that it can only be that assumption.
If the very definition of cont(.)/inf D (.) is fundamentally flawed, however, one would expect to see other pathological consequences of it which have nothing to do with (1). And indeed one does, without looking any further than (2) above. For it follows immediately from (2) and the fact that cont is non-negative, that
with equality only when cont(avb) = 0, i.e. p(avb) = 1. Carnap and Bar Hillel list (3) among the properties of cont, failing however to note how strongly it conflicts with any ordinary concept of information 21 -a failure all the more remarkable in the light of the basic and well-understood fact about conjoining statements that one typically gets much more in the way of consequences than the individual conjuncts by themselves would suggest. We have just encountered a prime example in e and e → h, both very weak statements that conjoin to give h (we are still assuming that h entails e), which can be any hypothesis as content-rich as you like. But since ev(e → h) is tautologous, (3) tells us that the content of h is nevertheless exactly equal to the sum of the contents of e and e → h. An extreme case of this example is got by letting h be ⊥ itself. In some formalisations of classical logic ⊥ replaces ∼ as a primitive symbol and negation is defined by ∼a := a → ⊥, so in this case e&(e → h) can be rewritten as e&∼e. But intuitively the content generated by a contradiction (every sentence is a consequence of it) is to all intents and purposes infinite by comparison with those of e and ∼e. By contrast, of course, inf R (e&∼e) offers no such affront to intuition, being actually infinite while both inf R (e) and inf R (∼e) are finite under the reasonable assumption that p(e) and p(∼e) are positive. Even without simple counterexamples from elementary logic, the history of science is an object-lesson in the fact that conjoining individually unremarkable assumptions can generate an explosion of remarkable, and sometimes revolutionary consequences. But that is just what (3) appears to deny, implying as it does that any conjunction will carry at most as much information as the sum of the amounts of information carried by the conjuncts separately. Inf, i.e. the -logp measure, does on the other hand satisfy the intuition that there will be non-extreme cases where according to any minimallyreasonable measure of information the conjunction of a pair, or in general a finite number, of statements contains more information than the sum of the informationcontents of the statements separately.
That is all very well, it might be said, but what has information construed as unexpectedness necessarily to do with consequence-classes? I might not be at all surprised to be told that a particular logically very strong statement is true, and very surprised to learn that a much weaker one is. 22 But that purely subjective sense of unexpectedness is not the relevant one here: because of their dependence on probability measures all information functions have to obey the rule that if Cn(a) ⊆ Cn(b), where Cn(.) is the consequence-class of ' . ', then inf(a) ≤ inf(b). 23 You may indeed be less surprised to be told that b is true than that a is, but that is because you are violating a basic rule of probability which states that if a is entailed by b, i.e. Cn(a) ⊆ Cn(b), then p(b) ≤ p(a); and if you do this while believing that your probability evaluations are the basis for sound bets then, as Ramsey and de Finetti famously pointed out, you leave yourself open to a so-called Dutch Book, i.e. a finite set of bets that will leave you with a certain loss. Respecting the relation of consequence-class inclusion thus partially 'objectifies' both estimates of uncertainty and the information measures based on them.
Nevertheless, it is not obvious that sensitivity to the relation of consequence-class inclusion should necessarily extend to sensitivity to measures of consequences themselves, nor that such measures, if they exist, should be measures of unexpectedness. However, in the next section I will show that such measures do exist on consequenceclasses, where the measure-terminology is justified by the fact that they are the restrictions of measures, in the technical sense, on all sets of sentences of an appropriate language L. I will show that these measures can be represented as decreasing functions f(p) of a probability p for a wide class of functions f which includes 1-p and -logp, and that they therefore qualify as measures of unexpectedness. However, it will also be shown that the measure on consequence-classes determined by the function 1-p is uniformly blind to new consequences generated by conjunction.
Consequences
It is an interesting fact that Cn(a) was Bar Hillel and Carnap's initial choice of a 'presystematic' qualitative explication of the semantic information contained in a 24 which, however, they discarded in favour of * M(a) (see above, Sect. 2), citing in the latter's favour its intuitive plausibility and being 'in accordance with the old philosophical principle "omnis determinatio est negatio" ' (Carnap and Bar Hillel 1952, p. 11) . But the main reason, they rather disarmingly confessed, is that it wins on simplicity (ibid.). They did not elaborate, but since the next stage of their procedure was to put a measure on whatever qualitative exemplar is selected, and since the Cn(a) do not form an algebra (only an upper semi-lattice under the operation of intersection) whereas the M(a) do (an algebra moreover isomorphic to the Lindenbaum sentence algebra of L), this may well be what they had in mind in preferring the * M(a) explication to the Cn(a) one. As we saw in section 2, any probability P on the M(a)-algebra assigns a value to * M(a), namely 1 − P(M(a)), inducing the measure cont(a) on the sentences of L.
On the other hand, if the foregoing is correct, cont. gives a strongly defective theory of semantic information, suggesting that the initial qualitative identification of the information in a as * M(a), despite its claimed simplicity, was misguided. In what follows I will attempt to demonstrate that this is indeed the case. The argument will be developed with the help of some elementary measure theory, where despite the apparently unpromising formal structure of the consequence-classes, the measures will actually be defined directly on them. There is no paradox, and certainly no inconsistency, in this proposal: the Cn(a) might not form an algebra, but the set of all subsets of the set of sentences of whatever language L is involved is an algebra, the power set algebra (assuming as before that the sentences are factored by equivalence), on which a finitely additive measure certainly exists; in fact there are infinitely many. Clearly, we can take the restriction of any such measure on that to be a measure on the Cn(a). 25 Now we can investigate what constraints are imposed on information functions f(p) by identifying them with finitely additive measures on the classes Cn(a). One relation between consequence-classes we already know to be reflected in a constraint on f(p): f must be a decreasing function of p to accommodate the fact that Cn(a) ⊆ Cn(b) ⇒ inf(a) ≤ inf(b) where inf (.) is given by f(p(.)). Also we should want f to be not only continuous but also sufficiently smooth, at least to the extent of possessing a first derivative everywhere in the open interval (0, 1). All this so far tells us little we don't already know. But there is a further fundamental fact about consequence-classes, namely that for all a, b,
for which there exists (so far) no corresponding constraint on f(p). And as I will show, the anomalous character of the function 1-p (i.e. inf D ) derives from just this omission. Indeed, I will prove that the function 1-p is not just blind to the relationship described in (4), but actually forces any measure Q on consequence-classes representing it to set at measure 0 all additional consequences created by conjunction. There are a couple of key assumptions on which the proof will rest: (a) that Q(Cn(a)) satisfies the basic rules of a measure inf(a) of the semantic information in a, and (b) that there is a measure Q agreeing with the function f(p(a)) = 1 − p(a) on the consequence-classes Cn(a). But not to disrupt the narrative I will give the very simple proof first and deal with the assumptions afterwards. As a first step, the basic properties of measure tell us that
But Cn(a) ∩ Cn(b) = Cn(avb), so we have
But if f(p) = 1 − p we also have
whence, assuming that f(p(a)) = Q(Cn(a)), we infer that
And putting (5) and (6) together, we infer that Q(Cn(a) ∪ Cn(b)) = Q(Cn(a&b))! So Q does indeed assign measure 0 to the additional consequences generated by conjunction. Conversely, it is easy to show that if Q is one of those measures Q which have this property then according to it, e and the Popper-Miller sentence e → h jointly exhaust the information in h when h entails e, however strong a statement h might be; yet e → h is a weaker sentence even than ∼e. For given that h entails e, the conjunction of e → h and e is equivalent to h, so that Q(Cn(e) ∪ Cn(e → h)) = Q(Cn(h)). Since the only common consequence of e and e → h is T, with Q({T}) = 0, this implies that Q(Cn(e)) + Q(Cn(e → h)) = Q(Cn(h)). In general however, for arbitrary Q, we have Q(Cn(e)) + Q(Cn(e → h)) ≤ Q(Cn(h)).
It is time to verify the two assumptions (a) and (b) stated above on which this result rests. (a), recall, is the assumption that Q(Cn(a)) satisfies the basic rules for a measure of the semantic information in a. This is very straightforward if we take the rules for a measure inf to be Carnap and Bar Hillel's two, (i) that inf(T) = 0, and (ii) that if a entails b then inf(b) ≤ inf(a) (Carnap and Bar Hillel 1952, p. 12 26 ): we simply set Q({T}) = 0, and we know from the preceding section that (ii) is satisfied. There is just one thing to be said in addition, and that is that we need the inequality in (ii) to be strict in interesting cases, like the one above, which means that Q(Cn(a)) must be finite for sufficiently weak a (this may sound vague but it is little different in principle from the usual sort of Bayesian condition that where e is an evidence statement, p(e) should be strictly between 0 and 1). We can't stipulate that Q must be finite on S however, because if we identify Q(Cn(a)) with f(p(a)) for a continuous decreasing continuous function f from [0, 1] into the extended non-negative real line, we need to accommodate the case of f(p) = −logp, whence Q(S) = Q(Cn(⊥)) = −logp(⊥) = +∞. The possibly diverse class of informationfunctions f(p) therefore means that we are talking not about a single measure Q but a class of measures depending on the types of information-function f(p). Now to assumption (b), that there is a measure Q agreeing with the function f(p(a)) = 1−p(a) on the consequence-classes Cn(a). In fact we can show that the class of functions f(p) representable as measures on consequence-classes are exactly those which are convex in (0,1). First, suppose that Q is a measure and Q(Cn(a)) = f(p(a)). Since Q is a measure and Cn(a) ∪ Cn(b)) ⊆ Cn(a&b) we must have
Hence, from (5) and (7),
Now let p(a) = x, p(b) = y and p(a&b) = x − h, for some h ≥ 0, and suppose that x < y. From the identity p(a) + p(b) = p(avb) + p(a&b) we also infer that p(avb) is equal to y + h. We thus obtain from the inequality (8) another:
for all h ≥ 0 and all x, y in (0,1). Dividing by h, (9) is the condition for a differentiable function f to be convex in (0,1) (where in addition f(1) = f(p(T)) = 0). Included in the class of such functions f are both f = 1 − p and f = −logp; excluded is the pseudo information function −log(p/(1 − p)), which is concave for values of p greater than 1/2. But we have (I hope) seen from the foregoing that the extremal case 1-p should also be excluded. It is not difficult to prove the converse, that the requirement that f be convex in (0,1) with f(1) = 0 is sufficient for the associated information function f(p) to be identified with the restriction of a finitely additive measure Q on the power set of S to the set of consequence-classes. For Q(Cn(a) ∪ Cn(b)) can simply be defined to be equal to f(p(a)) + f(p(b)) − f(p(avb)) for the finite additivity axiom for measures to be satisfied. All that remains is to show that Q(Cn(a) ∪ Cn(b)) ≤ Q(Cn(a&b)), i.e. f(p(a)) + f(p(b)) − f(p(avb)) ≤ f(p(a&b)). But we know that this follows from the convexity of f.
These results are to my knowledge new to the literature. As we have seen, they follow straightforwardly from the assumption that any information function f(p(a)) should reflect the properties of a measure Q on consequence-classes. That assumption can of course be questioned. As I pointed earlier, it follows the lead of Bar Hillel and Carnap who first selected a set-theoretical object to serve as the qualitative definition of information, and then put a measure on it which they identified with a decreasing function f(p) of p: all that is different here is that Bar Hillel and Carnap chose the classes * M(a) for the qualitative definition, with the deleterious consequence that the information function f(p) := 1 − p is then determined if the measure on the * M(a) is normalised, while I have chosen their own first choice, the classes Cn(a). Despite their failure to pursue it further, the case for that choice is, I believe, independently compelling: surely a fundamental feature of information, of central importance methodologically when we consider new, unifying and extending theories in science, is that in general new information is generated by the logical operation of conjunction, should be recognised by any adequate measure of semantic information. Hence the identification of f(p(a)) with Q(Cn(a)), whose power to generate novel and intuitively satisfying results has I believe amply proved itself. But the proof the pudding is not just in the eating: it also depends on the recipe. In this case both together, I believe, generate a reasonably satisfying dish.
Conclusion
According to Crupi and Tentori, [Bar Hillel and Carnap's] classical analyses [of semantic information] have not remained unchallenged ... but stand as a sound basis at least for our purposes. (Crupi and Tentori (2014), p. 81) In the light of the foregoing this claim must I think be strongly qualified. Of Bar Hillel and Carnap's two classic measures cont and inf of semantic information, only inf, i.e. -logp, seems to possess the credentials of a legitimate measure, but if my earlier argument is correct then the support measure based on it is fatally defective. On the positive side, we have another way of explicating semantic information, which Bar Hillel and Carnap themselves thought the most natural before prematurely abandoning it, which, unlike inf D , is not in conflict with the unexpectedness criterion.
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